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Introduction 
In 1977, Jerry Hartfield, a black man with an IQ of fifty-one, was 
charged with raping and murdering a white woman.1 A jury quickly 
sentenced Hartfield to death, but he appealed.2 Three years later, the 
 
1. Andrew Cohen, Held Without Retrial for 11,800 Days, Texas Inmate Still 
Waits for Justice, The Atlantic (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www. 
theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/01/held-without-retrial-for-11-800-
days-texas-inmate-still-waits-for-justice/266865/ [https://perma.cc/6ZWM-
MJFB]. 
2. Id. 
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Texas Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously reversed Hartfield’s con-
viction because the jury was tainted.3 While Hartfield awaited trial, the 
governor of Texas—with encouragement by prison officials—commuted 
Hartfield’s sentence from the death penalty to life in prison.4 At that 
point, Hartfield’s state-appointed attorney ceased representing 
Hartfield.5 Although Hartfield was entitled to a new trial, he proceeded 
to spend twenty-three years in prison until a fellow inmate noticed the 
mistake.6 
The inmate told Hartfield that he should have received a new trial 
when his case was reversed.7 Hartfield then began filing pro se petitions 
for a writ of habeas corpus in district court.8 In response, the court 
appointed a public defender to help with the case.9 Hartfield—with aid 
from his attorney—then began petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus 
in state court and was eventually denied by the Texas Court of Appeals 
in 2014.10 Hartfield argued that the thirty-four year pretrial delay 
caused by governmental negligence violated his constitutional right to 
a speedy trial.11 The trial court concluded that the delay was extra-
ordinary, that it was caused by governmental negligence, and that the 
thirty years of pretrial incarceration prejudiced the defendant, but it 
refused to find that a speedy trial violation had occurred because 
Hartfield’s twenty-three years of acquiescence weighed heavily against 
him.12 Again, Hartfield appealed.13 
On appeal, the state argued, “While the Barker balancing test 
contains few if any absolutes, Appellant’s twenty-three year delay in 
 
3. Id. 
4. Deborah Hastings, Texas Inmate Must Stay in Prison, Despite Conviction 
Being Overturned in 1980, N.Y. Daily News (Apr. 18, 2014, 1:50 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/texas-inmate-conviction-over 
turned-1980-behind-bars-article-1.1761084 [https://perma.cc/MZ9M-Y9SL]. 
5. Id. 
6. Michael Gracyzk, Jerry Hartfield Should Be Freed After Being Wrongfully 
Locked Up For Decades: Lawyers, The Huffington Post (Feb. 14, 2014, 
5:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/14/jerry-hartfield 
_n_4791122.html [https://perma.cc/5JWU-RLMD]. 
7. Id. 
8. See Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tex. App. 2014) (denying 
pretrial habeas relief). 
9. Id. at 810. 
10. Id. at 817. 
11. Amended Brief for Appellant at 3, Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. 
App. 2014) (No. 13-14-00238-CV). 
12. Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805, 811 n.5 (Tex. App. 2014). 
13. Id. at 811. 
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invoking his right to a new and speedy trial comes close to absolutely 
barring a finding that the right to speedy trial was violated during the 
relevant period.”14 The court acknowledged that Hartfield’s case may 
have been the longest gap in any speedy trial case15 but refused to reach 
the issue because of procedural technicalities.16 On remand, Hartfield 
was reconvicted of crimes he allegedly committed over three decades 
prior.17 Hartfield’s case demonstrates a major flaw with speedy trial 
jurisprudence.18 It is unjust to deny an ignorant and unrepresented 
defendant his constitutional right just because he was unaware of his 
duty to demand it from the court. 
This Note argues that courts’ misapplication of the “assertion 
factor” in the Barker speedy trial test has created problems in speedy 
trial jurisprudence.19 Courts’ reliance on the “assertion factor” has fost-
ered an unfair bias against dismissal of speedy trial cases in lower 
courts, allowed the courts to apply doctrine discredited by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and distorted the intention of the constitutional right 
to a speedy trial. This Note proposes that courts can solve these 
problems by eliminating the assertion factor from speedy trial analysis. 
Instead, courts should apply a three-part test composed of the remain-
ing Barker factors. 
This Note begins in Part I with a discussion of the historic back-
ground and policy considerations of the constitutional speedy trial 
right. Part II explains the Barker test and the assertion factor’s role. 
Part III addresses problems created by the Barker test’s assertion 
factor. Part IV discusses some potential ways of reinterpreting the 
Barker test in order to mitigate the problems addressed in Part III. 
I. Background and Policy of Sixth Amendment  
Right to Speedy Trial 
The right to a speedy trial has a long history and deep-rooted policy 
concerns for protecting the accused from unwanted harms caused by  
14. State’s Brief at 53, Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App. 2014) 
(No. 13-14-00240-CR) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972)). 
15. Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d at 808. 
16. Id. at 813 (“In other words, an alleged violation of a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial cannot be raised by pretrial habeas 
because a ruling on such an issue is not entitled to interlocutory review.”). 
17. Matt Ford, The Retrial of a Texas Man Imprisoned Despite an Overturned 
Conviction, The Atlantic (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com 
/national/archive/2015/08/the-retrial-of-a-texas-man-imprisoned-despite-
his-overturned-conviction/401876/ [https://perma.cc/492A-TM3W]. 
18. Hartfield’s case was resolved on the habeas issue, so the Court never dis-
cussed the speedy trial issue. Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d at 817.  
19. See infra Part III.B (discussing the Barker test). 
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pre-trial incarceration.20 Courts have tried to balance those harms with 
concerns for the difficulties prosecutors face in bringing defendants to 
trial.21 Balancing these concerns caused courts to form policies that 
make it extremely difficult for defendants to find relief for speedy trial 
violations. 
A. History of Speedy Trial Jurisprudence 
On its face, the Sixth Amendment sets simple guidelines for protect-
ing the criminally accused: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.”22 Despite centuries 
of speedy trial jurisprudence, however, courts have provided little guid-
ance for determining what constitutes a “speedy trial” and when a 
defendant’s constitutional right is violated.23 One reason for the lack of 
clarity is the trifling legislative history of the right.24 Scholars claim that 
history provides little explanation of why the framers decided to include 
the language in the Bill of Rights or of the framers’ intended applica-
tion.25 Consequently, historic English trial rights have been used to in-
terpret the language in the Sixth Amendment.26 Considering the im-
portance of history, the U.S. Supreme Court held, “the right to a speedy 
trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth 
Amendment. That right has its roots at the very foundation of our 
English law heritage.”27 
The constitutional framers’ most direct legislative influence on 
rights of the accused was the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.28 Yet, the 
timing concerns of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 focused on curing 
the problem of unlawfully detained prisoners, so it is unclear whether 
 
20. See infra Part II (discussing the history and policy concerns). 
21. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527–30 (1972) (explaining the need for a 
balancing test). 
22. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
23. See infra Part III (discussing application of the Barker test). 
24. See Susan N. Herman, The Right to a Speedy and Public Trial: A 
Reference Guide to the United States Constitution 161–67 (Jack 
Stark ed., 2006) (explaining the historical origins of the right to a speedy 
trial). 
25. Id. at 166–67. 
26. Id.; see also Alan L. Schneider, Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 
Stan. L. Rev. 476, 484 (1968) (“This paucity of historical data makes it 
difficult to ascertain the intent of the framers when they enacted the 
federal speedy-trial guarantee. Given this fact, it seems reasonable to 
construe the guarantee in light of the common-law sources from which the 
framers derived their legal education.”). 
27. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967). 
28. Id. 
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the act provided the foundation for the broader language of the Sixth 
Amendment.29 Scholars theorize that the inspiration for the framers to 
include the right to a speedy trial in the Bill of Rights may have come 
from the work of Sir Edward Coke.30 Coke’s influential seventeenth-
century treatise “endors[ed] the principle that a right to speedy disposi-
tion was a significant component of justice.”31 However, Coke was one 
of the only voices emphasizing the need for speedy trials at the time, 
making it unclear how much English parliament thought about these 
concerns when it enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.32 Therefore, 
the full extent of Coke’s ideas over the language of the Sixth 
Amendment remains unclear.33 
One clue about the policy interests behind the speedy trial language 
of the Sixth Amendment is a record of the majority of state delegates 
rejecting a proposed amendment to the language by Representative 
Burke of South Carolina.34 Burke proposed language that would allow 
a defendant to delay trial if needed to help his case,35 but the vast 
majority of delegates rejected Representative Burke’s proposal on the 
theory that the established processes of the justice system would be 
sufficient to ensure defendants’ ability to make their cases.36 Therefore, 
the founders may have intended the speedy trial clause to be minimally 
intrusive. 
Despite the ambiguous origins of the right to a speedy trial, the 
United States Supreme Court has managed to establish some guidelines 
for Sixth Amendment speedy trial jurisprudence. In Klopfer v. North 
Carolina,37 the petitioner was indicted for criminal trespass, but never 
convicted because of a mistrial.38 After his trial was postponed, Klopfer  
29. See 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679) (“For the prevention whereof and the more speedy 
Releife of all persons imprisoned for any such criminall or supposed criminal 
Matters . . . .”). 
30. Herman, supra note 24, at 164; see Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 225 (“Coke’s 
Institutes were read in the American Colonies by virtually every student of 
the law. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson wrote that at the time he studied law 
(1762–1767), ‘Coke Lyttleton was the universal elementary book of law 
students.’ And to John Rutledge of South Carolina, the Institutes seemed 
‘to be almost the foundation of our law.’ To Coke, in turn, Magna Carta was 
one of the fundamental bases of English liberty.” (footnotes omitted)). 
31. Herman, supra note 24, at 162. 
32. Id. at 163–64. 
33. Id. at 164–67. 
34. Id. at 166–67. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 167. 
37. 386 U.S. 213 (1967). 
38. Id. at 217. 
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petitioned the court to ascertain when his case would be heard.39 At 
that point, the state prosecutor asked for a “nolle prosequi with leave,” 
a local rule that allowed a defendant to go free but obligated him to 
return to trial at an undetermined future date.40 The Supreme Court 
found North Carolina’s nolle prosequi rule “clearly denie[d] the peti-
tioner the right to a speedy trial,” which the Court declared was funda-
mental.41 Therefore, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to 
a speedy trial applies to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.42 
One of the earliest cases to address how to apply the right to a 
speedy trial was Beavers v. Haubert.43 In Beavers, the defendant faced 
two separate indictments under federal attempted bribery statutes, but 
did not comply with a removal warrant requiring him to appear in a 
different district than the one in which the case originated.44 On appeal, 
the U.S. Supreme Court considered how speedy trial rights should be 
applied to a defendant facing multiple charges.45 Instead of making a 
hard ruling of when and how the right to a speedy trial attaches, the 
Beavers court considered the circumstances surrounding the defendant 
and made a ruling based on balancing the defendant’s needs and the 
practical concerns of local courts in managing the proceedings.46 The 
Court held, “The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is 
consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures 
rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice.”47 
Beavers demonstrates why courts have had difficulty setting firm guide-
lines on when and how to apply the right to a speedy trial. Since the 
right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative, courts examine the circum-
stances surrounding each individual case in order to determine whether 
a lengthy pre-trial delay was reasonable.  
39. Id. at 218. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 222–23 (“We hold here that the right to a speedy trial is as 
fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment. That 
right has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage. Its first 
articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have been made in Magna 
Carta (1215), wherein it was written, ‘We will sell to no man, we will not 
deny or defer to any man either justice or right’; but evidence of recognition 
of the right to speedy justice in even earlier times is found in the Assize of 
Clarendon (1166).” (footnote omitted)). 
42. Id. at 222. 
43. 198 U.S. 77 (1905). 
44. Id. at 78. 
45. Id. at 86. 
46. Id. at 87. 
47. Id. 
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Despite the ad hoc considerations prescribed in Beavers, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has managed to set some parameters on applying the 
right to a speedy trial. For instance, the Court determined that the 
meaning of “accused” in the Sixth Amendment requires some formal 
action by the government, and thus the right to a speedy trial attaches 
upon the arrest of a criminal defendant.48 Further, the Court held that 
only periods where charges are pending should count toward a speedy 
trial violation in cases involving multiple proceedings and reinstate-
ments.49 The Court has also held that the only adequate remedy for a 
speedy trial violation is dismissal.50 However, Chief Justice Burger 
reasoned, “[p]erhaps the severity of that remedy has caused courts to 
be extremely hesitant in finding a failure to afford a speedy trial. Be 
that as it may, we know of no reason why less drastic relief may not be 
granted in appropriate cases.”51 The innate need for balancing compet-
ing interests in criminal cases, and the strict remedy of dismissal, has 
made courts reluctant to grant relief to defendants and led to inconsis-
tent decisions in lower courts.52 This has caused a great deal of pain 
and confusion for defendants seeking relief for speedy trial violations. 
B. Policy Considerations and the “Demand-Waiver Rule” 
 The Supreme Court has emphasized concern for harms to defen-
dants caused by waiting for trial,53 but has held that courts need to 
balance those concerns with concerns for allowing the criminal justice 
 
48. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971) (“Invocation of the 
speedy trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other 
formal charge. But we decline to extend the reach of the amendment to the 
period prior to arrest.” (footnote omitted)). 
49. Herman, supra note 24, at 219; see United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 
302, 317 (1986) (holding that delay attributable to interlocutory appeals 
did not count for defendants’ speedy trial claim). 
50. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 (1973) (“The remedy for a 
violation of this constitutional right has traditionally been the dismissal of 
the indictment or the vacation of the sentence.”). 
51. Id. Legal scholars have criticized dismissal as a remedy for speedy trial 
violations. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and 
Criminal Procedure: First Principles 98–100 (1997) (discussing how 
dismissal does not properly relieve innocent defendants and grants a 
windfall to guilty defendants). 
52. See Herman, supra note 24, at 230 (“The reluctance of courts to invoke the 
‘severe remedy’ of dismissal unquestionably has an impact on the willingness 
of courts to find a constitutional violation . . . .”). 
53. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (“This guarantee is an 
important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to 
trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and 
to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused 
to defend himself.”). 
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system time to function properly.54 Unfortunately, the balance is not 
always easy to strike and can result in defendants waiting long periods 
of time prior to trial, and being deprived of their constitutional right.55 
Although there is clearly a need to be practical when creating criminal 
prosecution policy, speedy trial jurisprudence has heavily distorted the 
meaning of the constitutional language prescribing the right. 
 The plain meaning and courts’ interpretations of the Sixth 
Amendment suggest that the right only applies to defendants who are 
formally “accused,” which the Court interpreted to mean arrested.56 
According to Akhil Amar, the right to a speedy trial was intended to 
protect defendants specifically because they are accused.57 Once a 
person is formally accused, that person faces the harms of being detain-
ed and having their reputation damaged.58 The speedy trial clause was 
likely intended to mitigate these harms, especially for the falsely 
accused.59 Further, the right protects innocent defendants from being 
detained indefinitely by a tyrannical government that refuses to hold 
trial. Yet, when applying the right to a speedy trial, courts have consis-
tently balanced the interests of the public, the defendant, and the 
criminal justice system.60 This pragmatic approach to determining 
whether speedy trial rights are violated is somewhat necessary, given 
the wide range of complications involved in criminal prosecution.61 
Therefore, these concerns led to the creation of flexible speedy trial tests 
 
54. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971). 
55. See supra Introduction (discussing the case of Jerry Hartfield). 
56. Marion, 404 U.S. at 313 (“On its face, the protection of the Amendment is 
activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to 
those persons who have been ‘accused’ in the course of that prosecution. 
These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet 
accused . . . .”); Amar, supra note 51, at 102–03 (discussing how the Sixth 
Amendment is “accusation-based”). 
57. Amar, supra note 51 at 102.  
58. Id. at 102–03. 
59. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 41 (1970) (“It is intended to spare an 
accused those penalties and disabilities—incompatible with the presumption 
of innocence—that may spring from delay in the criminal process.”). 
60. See supra Part II.A (detailing the ambiguous reasons the framers included 
the language in the Bill of Rights and courts’ historical application of the 
right). 
61. See Dickey, 398 U.S. at 43 (“A criminal prosecution has many stages, and 
delay may occur during or between any of them.”); see also H. Richard 
Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1376, 1384 (1972) (“[D]elay-provoking circumstances are rarely related 
to the nature of the charges alone.”). 
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that consider various facets of a defendant’s case.62 The benefit of a 
flexible test comes with the cost of eliminating the guarantee of the 
right to a speedy trial. For example, by applying a balancing test, a 
court can find that the length of delay between a defendant’s arrest and 
trial is so long that the defendant has not “enjoyed the right to a speedy 
and public trial,” but not grant relief because there are preemptive 
countervailing interests.63 Additionally, courts share Representative 
Burke’s concerns over the dangers of a criminal justice system that 
moves too swiftly.64 For example, in United States v. Ewell,65 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held, “[a] requirement of unreasonable speed would have 
a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the 
ability of society to protect itself. Therefore . . . ‘[t]he right of a speedy 
trial is necessarily relative.’”66 Courts’ concerns for these underlying 
policy considerations and desire to stay true to the Constitution have 
led to inconsistent speedy trial jurisprudence. 
The Court’s declaration that the right to a speedy trial is funda-
mental led to fear of defendants who acquiesce to—or intentionally 
cause—procedural delays while awaiting trial and then subsequently 
claim to have their speedy trial right violated.67 This concern likely 
helped form what courts have termed the “demand doctrine,” or 
“demand-waiver rule.”68 Under the “demand-waiver rule,” if a defen-
dant does not make a timely demand for a speedy trial, the defendant 
waives his or her constitutional right.69 The “demand-waiver rule” was 
intended to prevent guilty defendants who benefit from trial delays 
from using the constitutional right to get their cases dismissed based  
62. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525–33 (1972) (describing the demand-
waiver rule and creating a balancing test). 
63. See State v. Parker, 296 P.3d 54, 62 (Ariz. 2013) (denying speedy trial 
violation despite a three-year and nine-month delay between arrest and trial 
because the pretrial incarceration did not prejudice the defendant’s case). 
64. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). 
65. 383 U.S. 116 (1966). 
66. Id. at 120. 
67. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 526 (“[C]ourts that have applied the demand-waiver 
rule have relied on the assumption that delay usually works for the benefit of 
the accused and on the absence of any readily ascertainable time in the 
criminal process for a defendant to be given the choice of exercising or waiving 
his right.”). 
68. Different jurisdictions refer to the rule as either “demand-waiver rule” or the 
“demand doctrine.” This Note will use the term “demand-waiver rule.” See 
e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 361 F.2d 824, 825 (2d Cir. 1966) (“Moreover, 
the right to a speedy trial after arrest or indictment is deemed waived unless 
promptly asserted.”); United States ex rel. Pizarro v. Fay, 353 F.2d 726, 727 
(2d Cir. 1965) (holding the same). 
69. Sanchez, 361 F.2d at 825. 
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on a technicality.70 However, the rigidness of the “demand-waiver rule” 
allowed courts to unjustly deny deserving defendants the full benefits 
of right to a speedy trial. In the seminal case, Barker v. Wingo,71 the 
U.S. Supreme Court addressed this problem.  
II. The Barker Test and Defendants’ Assertion of the 
Right to a Speedy Trial 
In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court rejected the rigid demand-
waiver rule, but still emphasized the need to consider defendants’ asser-
tion of the right to a speedy trial.72 Promoting this policy, the Court 
established a four-factor balancing test that has become the quint-
essential test courts apply when determining whether defendants have 
been deprived of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.73 This con-
flicting ideology has led to inconsistent application of the Barker test 
by lower courts, and created difficulties for defendants trying to find 
relief for speedy trial violations. 
A. Rejection of the “Demand-Waiver Rule” 
In Barker, the defendant was indicted along with Silas Manning for 
beating an elderly couple to death with a tire iron.74 The state found it 
necessary to use Manning’s testimony in order to convict Barker, so it 
had the court schedule Barker’s trial to occur after Manning’s.75 How-
ever, over the course of four years, the state brought five trials before 
convicting Manning due to two hung juries, an illegal search, and a 
venue change.76 Meanwhile, the state made sixteen motions for continu-
ance to postpone Barker’s trial, while awaiting Manning’s conviction.77 
At his trial, Barker moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated.78 The trial court  
70. See Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 846, 
853 (1957) (“This ‘demand doctrine’ stresses that the right to speedy trial is 
not designed as a sword for defendant’s escape, but rather as a shield for his 
protection. The courts reason that requiring demand will accomplish this 
purpose since it will lead toward trial on the merits and not to a technical 
evasion of the charge. A strong minority, however, rejects the ‘demand 
doctrine’ . . . .”). 
71. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
72. Id. at 528. 
73. See id. at 527–30 (explaining the need for a four-factor balancing test). 
74. Id. at 516. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 516–17. 
77. Id. at 517. 
78. Id. at 518. 
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denied the motion and the Sixth Circuit affirmed based on the 
“demand-waiver rule.”79 On review, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed 
Barker’s conviction because Barker did not demonstrate he wanted a 
trial, but rejected the “demand-waiver rule” as being “insensitive to a 
right . . . deemed fundamental.”80 The Court reasoned that funda-
mental rights require an affirmative action to trigger waiver, and the 
“demand-waiver rule” negated this requirement.81 In addition, the rigid 
adherence to a “demand-waiver rule” would force some defendants to 
make a choice whether to accept some possibly advantageous delay at 
the cost of forgoing later relief for a speedy trial violation.82 According 
to Justice Powell, this would put the government at a significant ad-
vantage.83 
After rejecting the “demand-waiver rule” for being too unfair to 
criminal defendants, the Barker Court emphasized the importance of 
balancing interests in determining whether a defendant’s right to a 
speedy trial has been violated.84 The Court reasoned that there are 
societal interests in providing speedy trials, separate from rights of the 
accused.85 Justice Powell concluded that societal interests in speedy 
trials include: limiting the backlog of cases in urban courts, preventing 
persons released on bond from having the opportunity to commit other 
 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 529–30. 
81. Id. at 525 (“Such an approach, by presuming waiver of a fundamental right 
from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court’s pronouncements on waiver of 
constitutional rights.”). 
82. See id. at 527 (“It is also noteworthy that such a rigid view of the demand-
waiver rule places defense counsel in an awkward position. Unless he 
demands a trial early and often, he is in danger of frustrating his client’s 
right. If counsel is willing to tolerate some delay because he finds it 
reasonable and helpful in preparing his own case, he may be unable to obtain 
a speedy trial for his client at the end of that time.”). The American Bar 
Association also advocated for rejecting the demand-waiver rule, claiming it 
unfairly impacts defendants. Id. at 528 n.28 (“The American Bar Association 
also rejects the rigid demand-waiver rule: ‘One reason for this position is that 
there are a number of situations, such as where the defendant is unaware of 
the charge or where the defendant is without counsel, in which it is unfair 
to require a demand . . . . Jurisdictions with a demand requirement are faced 
with the continuing problem of defining exceptions, a process which has not 
always been carried out with uniformity . . . . More important, the demand 
requirement is inconsistent with the public interest in prompt disposition of 
criminal cases. . . . [T]he trial of a criminal case should not be unreasonably 
delayed merely because the defendant does not think that it is in his best 
interest to seek prompt disposition of the charge.’”). 
83. Id. at 527–28. 
84. Id. at 530. 
85. Id. at 519. 
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crimes, mitigating temptation for the accused to jump bail and escape, 
and reducing the monetary costs of lengthy pre-trial detention.86 Powell 
also considered harm to defendants: 
The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on 
the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; 
and it enforces idleness. Most jails offer little or no recreational 
or rehabilitative programs. The time spent in jail is simply dead 
time. Moreover, if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his 
ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare 
his defense. Imposing those consequences on anyone who has not 
yet been convicted is serious. It is especially unfortunate to im-
pose them on those persons who are ultimately found to be inno-
cent. Finally, even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, 
he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living 
under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility.87 
However, the Barker Court considered that a delay may actually work 
to a defendant’s advantage by weakening the prosecution’s case, and 
held that a delay does not per se prejudice the accused’s ability to 
defend himself.88 Based on these notions, the Barker Court created the 
balancing test that has become a common standard courts apply when 
determining whether defendants are deprived of the constitutional right 
to a speedy trial.89 
B. Overview of the Barker Test 
In Barker, the Court considered the circumstantial nature of speedy 
trial violations and determined that applying an ad hoc balancing test 
is best way of ensuring justice.90 In creating the test, Justice Powell 
determined four factors the court would consider.91 The four factors—
which this Note refers to as the “Barker factors”—are: (1) the length 
of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion 
of his or her right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.92 In his opinion, 
 
86. Id. at 519–20. 
87. Id. at 532–33. 
88. Id. at 521. 
89. Id. at 530. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
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Justice Powell was clear about leaving room for discretion when decid-
ing future speedy trial cases.93 Further, the opinion contradictorily re-
jected the “demand-waiver rule” because it unfairly prejudiced defen-
dants, while holding that defendants must clearly show they wanted a 
speedy trial in order to take advantage of the right.94 
The consequence of the Barker court’s broad language and conflict-
ing ideas has been widely varying application of the Barker test.95 
Courts generally only dismiss cases for speedy trial violations if three 
of the four Barker factors weigh in favor of a defendant.96 Yet, “[t]he 
complex nature of the Barker v. Wingo balancing test makes it im-
possible to evaluate the courts’ results for consistency.”97 Commentators 
have expressed a variety of concerns about how courts misapply the 
Barker factors to the detriment of defendants.98 While there are numer-
ous legitimate concerns, this Note narrowly focuses on the third factor 
of the test, considering the consequences of allowing courts to use the 
nature of defendants’ assertion of the right to a speedy trial in deter-
mining whether to dismiss cases. 
C. The Defendant’s Assertion of His or Her Right to a Speedy Trial 
In Barker, Justice Powell cautioned that the “demand-waiver rule” 
could lead to an “automatic, pro forma demand made immediately after 
the appointment of counsel . . . .”99 However, Justice Powell was clear 
that the Court still believes that defendants have a responsibility to 
demand the right to a speedy trial.100 He reasoned that including the 
defendant’s assertion or failure to assert his or her right as a factor in 
 
93. See id. at 536 (“We do not hold that there may never be a situation in 
which an indictment may be dismissed on speedy trial grounds where the 
defendant has failed to object to continuances.”). 
94. See id. at 528–36 (rejecting the demand-waiver rule, but then holding that 
the defendant’s lack of effort to demand trial should be heavily weighed 
against him). 
95. See 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 933 (2016) (discussing a variety of 
cases involving applications of the Barker test); see also infra Part IV 
(discussing some of these cases in detail). 
96. Herman, supra note 24, at 223. 
97. Id. at 222. 
98. Id. 
99. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 528 (1972) (“The result in practice is likely 
to be either an automatic, pro forma demand made immediately after 
appointment of counsel or delays which, but for the demand-waiver rule, 
would not be tolerated. Such a result is not consistent with the interests of 
defendants, society, or the Constitution.”). 
100. Id. (“We reject, therefore, the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a 
speedy trial forever waives his right. This does not mean, however, that the 
defendant has no responsibility to assert his right.”). 
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the balancing test would promote fairness by giving the court 
flexibility.101 
It would permit, for example, a court to attach a different weight 
to a situation in which the defendant knowingly fails to object from a 
situation in which his attorney acquiesces in long delay without ade-
quately informing his client, or from a situation in which no counsel is 
appointed. “It would also allow a court to weigh the frequency and force 
of the objections as opposed to attaching significant weight to a purely 
pro forma objection.”102 
Further, Justice Powell made it clear that the court wanted to 
maintain constitutional principles and precedent that require defen-
dants to take an affirmative action in order to waive fundamental rights 
protected by the Constitution.103 However, he distinguished the right to 
a speedy trial from other fundamental rights: “[T]he right to a speedy 
trial is unique in its uncertainty as to when and under what circum-
stances it must be asserted or may be deemed waived.”104 Adding to the 
confusion, the Court stressed, “[t]he defendant’s assertion of his speedy 
trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight . . . that failure 
to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that 
he was denied a speedy trial.”105 The contradictory language of the 
Barker opinion has led to inconsistency, confusion, and abuse by lower 
courts in decisions regarding speedy trial violations. 
Courts have interpreted the Barker test to mean that defendants 
must make a “reasonable assertion” of a right to a speedy trial.106 Courts 
determine whether a defendant has made a “reasonable assertion” by 
considering the circumstances surrounding the case. Courts consider 
whether the defendant is represented by legal counsel, whether the 
defendant communicates with her counsel, whether counsel makes a 
formal demand or complaint, what form the demand complaint is in, 
and if the defendant makes a demand to the court pro se.107 Effectively, 
courts attempt to determine how badly a defendant wanted a speedy 
trial based on the form of her invocation of the right. For example, 
courts give a great deal of weight to objections to prosecutors’ motions 
 
101. Id. at 528–29.  
102. Id. at 529 (emphasis added). 
103. Id.; supra text accompanying note 76. 
104. Barker, 407 U.S. 514 at 529. 
105. Id. at 531–32. 
106. See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Pemberton, 813 F.2d 626, 629 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(finding the defendant was obligated to make a “reasonable assertion of his 
speedy trial right” in light of Barker v. Wingo). 
107. Brian R. Means, Postconviction Remedies § 38:7 (2016); 23 C.J.S. 
Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 803 (2016). 
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for continuance.108 Courts have also determined that a defendant can 
assert the right to a speedy trial either by communication to prosecu-
tion, or communication to the court, but give more weight to com-
munications made directly to the court.109 Courts are generally more 
flexible when deciding cases in which a defendant has articulated a 
demand without the assistance of counsel.110 For example, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s repeated requests to 
secure counsel, out of fear of losing evidence, was helpful in constituting 
a demand for a speedy trial.111 
When deciding whether to acknowledge that a defendant made an 
assertion, courts look at the context of “the assertion” and decide 
whether the defendant really desired to be tried promptly.112 In State v. 
Rachie,113 the district court found that the defendant made a clear de-
mand for a speedy trial, but the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed 
because the demand was not on the record.114 In State v. Washington,115 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered a defendant’s demands 
for forensic evidence testing as evidence of informally asserting his right 
 
108. See United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 211 (5th Cir. 2007) (“An assertion 
of that right is a demand for a speedy trial, which will generally be an 
objection to a continuance or a motion asking to go to trial.”); see also Laws 
v. Stephens, 536 F. App’x 409, 413 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding defendant 
“insufficiently and inconsistently asserted his speedy-trial rights” as “[h]e 
concurrently signed an ‘Agreed Setting’ form and took other actions 
suggesting that he was not, in fact, ready for trial” (citing Millard v. Lynaugh, 
810 F.2d 1403, 1406 (5th Cir. 1987))); United States v. Villalobos, 560 F. 
App’x 122, 127 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that although the defendant raised the 
issue of his right to a speedy trial both through motions and in court, 
“‘[r]epeated assertions of the right do not, however, balance this factor in favor 
of a petitioner when other actions indicate that he is unwilling or unready to 
go to trial’” (quoting Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 764 (3d Cir. 1993))). 
109. See Prince v. Alabama, 507 F.2d 693, 703 (5th Cir. 1975) (“We interpret 
these rulings as an indication that the courts should take a liberal view of 
convict-defendants’ attempts to contact the prosecutors and courts in other 
jurisdictions regarding charges pending against them there.”). 
110. Herman, supra note 24, at 228. 
111. Douglas v. Cathel, 456 F.3d 403, 418 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[H]is well-documented 
efforts to secure counsel are properly viewed as part and parcel of his efforts 
to assert his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.”). 
112. See United States v. Litton Sys., Inc., 722 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(rejecting the notion that a letter from defense counsel dissolving an 
agreement to suspend further action in criminal case proceedings during 
settlement negotiations asserted defendant's right to a speedy trial). 
113. 427 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
114. Id. at 257. 
115. 665 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
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to a speedy trial.116 Because the defendant’s complaints about testing 
were coupled with a subsequent formal request for speedy trial, the 
court weighed the assertion factor in the defendant’s favor.117 However, 
the same court distinguished Washington in State v. Williams118 by 
holding that a motion for discovery does not evidence assertion of the 
right to a speedy trial when the state does not delay the trial to collect 
evidence.119 
In Adams v. State,120 the Supreme Court of Mississippi ac-
knowledged that the defendant’s counsel expressed that the defendant’s 
speedy trial right may have been violated, but nonetheless decided, “if 
anything, [the defendant] asserted a right to an instant trial.”121 The 
Adams court seemed to differentiate between moving for a speedy trial 
and moving to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.122 Further, courts con-
sider the timing and form of a defendant’s request for speedy trial.123 
For example, in United States v. Henson,124 the First Circuit held that 
a letter sent to the district court prior to any formal charges being filed 
against the defendant was not sufficient to be considered evidence of 
asserting the right to a speedy trial.125 In State v. O’Brien,126 the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that the defendant, who waived his right to a 
speedy trial under state law, was not entitled to Sixth Amendment 
speedy trial relief because he did not make formal written objections to 
the prosecution’s continuances.127 
 
116. Id. at 808. 
117. Id. 
118. 207 N.C. App. 266 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). 
119. Id. at *5 (“[W]hen there is no indication that the State delayed the trial in 
order to collect discoverable material, we will not interpret a defendant’s 
motion for discovery as an assertion of his right to a speedy trial.”). 
120. 583 So. 2d 165 (Miss. 1991). 
121. Id. at 169. 
122. Id. 
123. See United States v. Henson, 945 F.2d 430, 438 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that a 
defendant did not assert his Sixth Amendment rights when, prior to any 
charges being filed against him, he submitted a letter to the court requesting 
a speedy disposition); see also State v. O’Brien, 516 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ohio 
1987) (holding that after a defendant agrees in writing to waive his rights to 
a speedy trial, he will not be entitled to a dismissal for a speedy trial unless 
he “files a formal written objection to any further continuances and makes a 
demand for trial . . . .”). 
124. 945 F.2d 430 (1st Cir. 1991). 
125. Id. at 438–39. 
126. 516 N.E.2d 218 (Ohio 1987). 
127. Id. at 221. 
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In addition, courts are willing to acknowledge unorthodox asser-
tions of speedy trial rights, but have a high threshold for deciding to 
weigh the factor in favor of the defendant.128 For instance, a court may 
acknowledge a motion to dismiss as demonstrating a defendant’s desire 
for a speedy trial but will not weigh the assertion factor in the defen-
dant’s favor if the motion is not sufficiently vigorous.129 The Texas 
Court of Appeals even held, “[a] request for a dismissal instead of a 
speedy trial weakens his claim because it shows a desire to have no trial 
instead of a speedy trial.”130 The Sixth Circuit has considered bail re-
quests as evidence of defendants asserting the right to a speedy trial.131 
Yet, the court only weighed the assertion factor in the defendant’s favor 
because the bail requests were coupled with a series of forceful de-
mands.132 In sum, courts have a large degree of discretion in deciding 
what constitutes an assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and even 
more discretion in deciding how to weigh the assertion factor when 
applying the Barker test. 
D. Weighing the Assertion Factor 
When applying the Barker test, courts consider the evidence for 
each factor independently and decide which factors weigh in favor, or 
against the defendant.133 Generally, the standard of review for a speedy 
 
128. Cf. Henson, 945 F.3d 430 at 438–39 (holding that a letter sent before federal 
charges had been lodged against a defendant did not carry enough weight 
to find assertion). 
129. See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Pemberton, 813 F.2d 626, 628–29 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(finding that the defendant’s motion to dismiss did not relieve him of his duty 
“to make a reasonable assertion of his speedy trial right”). See also Phillips 
v. State, 650 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (citation omitted) 
(“Although a motion to dismiss notifies the State and the court of the speedy 
trial claim, a defendant’s motivation in asking for dismissal rather than a 
prompt trial is clearly relevant, and may sometimes attenuate the strength of 
his claim.”). 
130. Parkerson v. State, 942 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. App. 1997) (citations 
omitted). See also United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 212 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 534–35 (1972)) (“A motion for 
dismissal is not evidence that the defendant wants to be tried promptly.”). 
131. See Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 384 (6th Cir. 1982) (“We hold that a 
demand for reasonable bail is the functional equivalent of a demand for a 
speedy trial.”). 
132. Id. at 384 (“Cain forcefully raised the speedy trial right on at least five 
different occasions.”). 
133. See Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1167 (Md. 2002) (“[O]ur independent 
constitutional appraisal of the petitioner’s speedy trial claims begins most 
effectively with a factor-by-factor approach.”). 
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trial right violation turns on whether three Barker factors “weigh heav-
ily in the defendant’s favor.”134 However, the Barker opinion’s emphasis 
on ad hoc considerations gives courts full discretion to decide which 
factors support the defendants and how much weight to give to each 
individual factor.135 Further, the Fifth Circuit has stated that, “[m]ere 
assertion of the speedy trial right is not enough for this factor to weigh 
in a defendant’s favor.”136 Depending on the circumstances, a court may 
find that the defendant needed to make continuous demands for trial 
starting immediately after arrest, or that a single demand made at a 
reasonable time was sufficient.137 This wide range of discretion effect-
ively gives defendants no guidance on whether their demands will be 
sufficient for the court and impedes criminal defense strategy.138 
When deciding whether to weigh the assertion factor in the defen-
dant’s favor, courts often examine the vigor and timeliness of the defen-
dant’s assertion.139 However, courts’ liberal analysis of the timeliness 
and vigor of a defendant’s speedy trial demands can make the assertion 
factor so malleable that it becomes meaningless.140 For example, in 
Glover v. State,141 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that 
although the defendant demanded a speedy trial two months after his 
indictment and then again one year later, the defendant’s failure to 
demand a speedy trial following an additional postponement of his case 
demonstrated an insufficient assertion of his right to a speedy trial, so 
 
134. United States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 410 (5th Cir. 2016) (“The court can 
presume prejudice if the first three factors weigh heavily in the defendant’s 
favor; if they do not, the defendant must show actual prejudice.”). 
135. Herman, supra note 24, at 222. 
136. United States v. Parker, 505 F.3d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 2007). 
137. See Johnson v. State, 975 S.W.2d 644, 651 (Tex. App. 1998) (explaining that 
the assertion factor would have weighed more heavily in defendant’s favor 
had she persistently demanded her right to a speedy trial). See also Williams 
v. State, 610 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. 2005) (noting that the defendant’s demand 
for a speedy trial made six months after indictment would have weighed in 
his favor if not for subsequent action by defendant’s counsel). 
138. Herman, supra note 24, at 223. See Christopher S. Elmore, Glover v. State: 
A Misinterpretation and Misapplication of the Barker Speedy Trial 
Balancing Test Results in the Weakening of a Criminal Defendant’s Right 
to a Prompt Trial, 62 Md. L. Rev. 573 (2003) (discussing how the 
Maryland courts misapplied the Barker test). 
139. See Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1170 (Md. 2002). 
140. See id. (deciding that the assertion factor did not weigh in favor of the 
defendant despite multiple attempts to demand a speedy trial). 
141. 792 A.2d 1160 (Md. 2002). 
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that the assertion factor did not weigh in his favor.142 The court reason-
ed that Glover should have objected to the pre-trial delays sooner.143 
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed with the weight the 
lower court placed on the factor,144 the court nevertheless affirmed the 
decision because the delay did not “unduly prejudice[] the defendant.”145 
In some cases, courts have bifurcated vigorousness and timeliness 
when analyzing the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial.146 
For example, in Johnson v. State the court held that although the 
defendant made a timely request for a speedy trial, the assertion factor 
did not weigh heavily in the defendant’s favor because the defendant’s 
demand was not sufficiently vigorous.147 The Johnson Court based its 
decision on the fact that the defendant did not make subsequent persis-
tent demands for trial after her initial timely request.148 
Further, some courts have refused to weigh the assertion factor in 
favor of the defendant—despite the defendant expressing a clear de-
mand for trial—because of technicalities.149 For example, in State v. 
Spivey,150 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the defendant 
made a prompt assertion of his right to a speedy trial, but the assertion 
factor did not weigh in his favor because the defendant acted pro se 
despite having competent legal representation.151 
 
142. Id. at 1170. 
143. Id. 
144. See id. (“While we agree that, upon learning that the third postponement 
resulted in a six-month delay . . . the petitioner could have, and probably 
should have, immediately asserted his right to a speedy trial, we must 
disagree with the excessive weight the Court of Special Appeals places on 
this facet of the case.”). 
145. Id. at 1172. 
146. See Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 651–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) 
(footnotes omitted) (“This late assertion, had no subsequent motion been 
filed, might well have undercut his Sixth Amendment claim. But appellant’s 
second attempt to seek a speedy trial, which came less than two months 
after the trial court denied his initial motion, evidenced his persistence. This 
is not a case where appellant never asked for a hearing.”). 
147. See Johnson v. State, 975 S.W.2d 644, 651 (Tex. App. 1998) (citation 
omitted) (“The failure to invoke the right earlier does not amount to waiver, 
but because Appellant did not persistently assert her right to a speedy trial, 
we did not weigh this factor heavily in her favor.”). 
148. Id. 
149. See State v. Spivey, 579 S.E.2d 251, 256 (N.C. 2003) (noting, first, that the 
defendant’s assertion through pro se was improper, but even so, “the 
assertion of the right, by itself, did not entitle him to relief”).  
150. 579 S.E.2d 251 (N.C. 2003). 
151. Id. at 256. 
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In addition, courts often tie the nature of defendants’ speedy trial 
demands in with other factors in the Barker test.152 For example, courts 
have considered a defendant’s failure to make an early demand for 
speedy trial as demonstrating lack of prejudice faced by the defen-
dant.153 A court may reason that a defendant who does not make an 
early demand for speedy trial relief is not really seeking a speedy trial.154 
This type of reasoning is problematic not only because it results in 
courts erroneously finding that defendants acquiesced to delays, but 
also because it makes the assertion factor superfluous. 
Authors have written about many societal interests in providing 
defendants with speedy trials beyond those considered in the Barker 
balancing test.155 Although concepts such as governmental needs and 
victims’ relief provide good rationales for creating policy, the 
Constitution does not confer a duty on the court to consider these con-
cerns.156 Furthermore, it is important to reflect on tradition and history. 
Courts have always weighed governmental, societal, and defendants’ 
interests when considering the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to 
a speedy trial.157 Keeping these concerns in mind, this Note analyzes 
how courts should determine whether to grant criminal defendants relief 
for speedy trial right violations, and attempts to provide a modified 
test that allows for necessary considerations, yet stays true to the intent 
of the Sixth Amendment. 
III. Problems Created by the Assertion Factor 
By including the assertion factor in the Barker test, the Supreme 
Court intended to preserve the defendant’s obligation to make some 
 
152. See Ex parte Anderson, 979 So. 2d 777, 781 (Ala. 2007) (citation omitted). 
153. Id. 
154. State v. Rachie, 427 N.W.2d 253, 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
155. See Herman, supra note 24, at 208 (“The Court has settled on the idea 
that the Sixth Amendment right serves three purposes for defendants—
preventing undue restraint on liberty, undue anxiety and disruption of one’s 
life because of pending charges, and undue impairment of the ability to 
defend against the charges . . . .”); see also Mary Beth Ricke, Note, Victims’ 
Right to a Speedy Trial: Shortcomings, Improvements, and Alternatives to 
Legislative Protection, 41 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 181, 184 (2013) (arguing 
that speedy trial helps victims get relief from timely convictions); Tobias 
Weiss, The Federal Speedy Trial: Speedy Injustice?, 56 Conn. B.J. 245, 
246–47 (1982) (arguing that the Speedy Trial Act benefits the government 
by catching unprepared defendants off-guard). 
156. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (stating broad rights of the accused in a 
criminal trial). 
157. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the history of speedy trial jurisprudence). 
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kind of demand for a speedy trial.158 Despite the Court’s good inten-
tions, the factor created several problems in speedy trial jurisprudence. 
Courts’ general resistance to dismissing cases and inconsistent opinions 
in the lower courts places an unfair burden on defendants who suffer 
lengthy pre-trial delays. In addition, courts may find improper demands 
to be dispositive in cases and effectively apply the demand-waiver rule. 
Further, the assertion factor has allowed courts to deny speedy trial 
violations in the vast majority of cases, and thus not enforce the 
guaranteed protections intended by the Constitution. 
A. Unfair Burden on Criminal Defendants 
The flexibility of the Barker test leaves defendants at the mercy of 
a court’s discretion. A court can find that a defendant made a timely 
demand for a speedy trial, was prejudiced by the delay, did not person-
ally cause the delay, but deny dismissal because the defendant did not 
sufficiently and vigorously assert his right.159 Courts essentially have 
the power to determine whether a defendant actually wanted a speedy 
trial, and decide that to be dispositive. There is no limit to what a court 
can consider sufficiently vigorous or timely, and defendants’ failures to 
make timely and vigorous demands are not always due to acquiescence 
to the delay.160 For example, an insolvent defendant may be represented 
by an overworked public defender who does not have time to pay close 
attention to the case, and consequently does not make vigorous asser-
tions for her client’s right to a speedy trial.161 Thus, through no fault of 
the defendant, the court may deny that there has been a speedy trial 
violation because of the apparent failure by the defendant to properly 
assert his right to a speedy trial. 
For example, consider the case of Jerry Hartfield.162 The court de-
nied Hartfield his constitutional right to a speedy trial just because he 
 
158. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 528 (1972). 
159. Herman, supra note 24, at 222. See Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805, 811 
n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (describing how the trial court weighed the 
Barker factors). 
160. See Ford, supra note 17. 
161. See David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 1281 (2002) (“Public defender offices are 
chronically understaffed and cannot pay enough to retain experienced 
attorneys. Lawyers appointed from private practice are paid far below 
market rates and often face unrealistically low fee caps. Consequently, poor 
defendants represented under either system often receive substandard 
representation: Attorneys lack the time and resources to mount the kind of 
defense any informed, paying client would expect.”). 
162. See supra notes 1–17 and accompanying text (describing the facts of Jerry 
Hartfield’s criminal prosecution and petition for writ of habeas corpus). 
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failed to demand it during his twenty-three years of incarceration.163 
The court was well aware of Hartfield’s mental incompetency and lack 
of legal representation during his prison sentence, yet the court still 
weighed the assertion factor heavily against Hartfield.164 This brings to 
light a glaring flaw with the current state of speedy trial jurisprudence. 
Courts are disregarding the hardships faced by defendants navigating a 
complex criminal justice system, with harsh consequences. Courts 
require defendants to make appropriately timed and sufficiently clear 
invocations of the right to a speedy trial, despite inconsistent and un-
clear standards for what courts consider to be proper demands.165 
Besides, courts do not seem to care whether defendants are aware of 
the duty, or capable of properly asserting the right to a speedy trial. 
Why should defendants bear the burden of properly asking the state 
for a constitutional right? How can the court decide whether a defen-
dant really wants a speedy trial? Is a defendant’s demand for a speedy 
trial not sufficient in itself? One explanation for courts’ variable appli-
cations of the assertion factor is reluctance to dismiss charges.166 
Because the United States Supreme Court has set minimal guidelines 
for applying the Barker factors, courts are free to use the assertion 
factor as an excuse for denying dismissal.167 Often, the facts of a case 
dictate that certain Barker factors clearly weigh in favor of or against 
a defendant.168 Therefore, courts rely on the malleability of the assertion 
factor to decide against defendants in close cases. 
For instance, a defendant may have suffered a sufficiently lengthy 
delay from arrest to trial, been prejudiced by the delay, and found case 
law showing these factors must be weighed in the defendant’s favor. 
However, the reason for the delay may be something that the court 
considers neutral. If the court applies a general rule of dismissal when 
three of the four Barker factors weigh in favor of the defendant, then 
the assertion factor becomes very important. A court that is convinced 
of a defendant’s guilt, or is generally hesitant to dismiss a case, will try 
to find a way to weigh the assertion factor against the defendant. Since 
the standard for what constitutes a sufficient demand for a speedy trial 
 
163. Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805, 813, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
164. Id. at 811 n.5. 
165. See supra Part II.C–D (discussing how courts apply the Barker test’s 
assertion factor and how to consider assertions when weighing the Barker 
factors). 
166. See Herman, supra note 24, at 222 (noting that a hesitation to dismiss is 
possibly implicit in language of Barker, Macdonald, and Loud Hawk). 
167. See supra Part II (discussing the application of the Barker test). 
168. See supra Part II.D (discussing how courts weigh the Barker factors). 
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is unclear, courts are free to weigh the assertion factor based on what-
ever criteria they see fit.169 
For example, in Boseman v. State,170 the Georgia Supreme Court 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for a speedy trial right vio-
lation despite the defendant waiting for trial in custody for twenty-
seven months.171 The court found that the delay was sufficiently long, 
and the reason for the delay should weigh in the defendant’s favor.172 
Also, the court “assume[d] that the 27 month delay, standing alone, 
was oppressive.”173 However, with relatively no discussion, the court did 
not weigh the assertion factor in favor of the defendant because he 
waited twenty-seven months to file a motion to dismiss.174 Despite the 
lengthy delay and presumed prejudice, the court denied the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss because there was “no impairment to his defense.”175 
This type of reasoning contradicts the U.S. Supreme Court’s decis-
ions in Barker and Klopfer.176 In Barker and Klopfer, the Court stressed 
the importance of considering the inherent harms defendants suffer be-
cause they are awaiting trial.177 Respecting the essential holdings of 
those decisions, courts should work to guarantee the right to a speedy 
trial in order to eliminate the serious harms that pre-trial delays cause 
criminal defendants. Apparently, this is not the case.178 Ambiguous 
standards for what constitutes a sufficiently vigorous or timely assert-
ion—and the omnipresent argument of defendants acquiescing to de-
lays—make the assertion factor an excuse for courts to unjustly refuse 
to dismiss cases. Courts’ efforts to avoid dismissal place an unfair burd-
en on criminal defendants. The Supreme Court seems to support this 
pervasive injustice because of its unwillingness to clarify the Barker 
test.179 
 
169. Id. 
170. 438 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. 1994). 
171. Id. at 629. 
172. Id. at 628–29. 
173. Id. at 629. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1972); Klopfer v. State, 386 U.S. 
213, 222 (1967). 
177. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532–33; Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 222. 
178. See Herman, supra note 24, at 220 (explaining how courts generally never 
dismiss cases for speedy trial right violations). 
179. See id. at 207–12 (explaining that there has not been a Supreme Court case 
addressing speedy trial issues since Barker). 
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B. Courts Applying the “Demand-Waiver” Rule 
At first blush, the Barker court’s rejection of the rigid “demand-
waiver rule” and call for the weighing of the assertion factor seemed to 
allow courts additional means for granting defendants relief in speedy 
trial cases.180 However, Justice Powell’s emphasis on considering the 
frequency and force of speedy trial assertions effectively gave courts 
enough latitude to find the factor to be either determinative or incon-
sequential.181 Courts consider a defendant’s failure to make timely or 
frequent demands as demonstrating acquiescence to the delay and find 
that the delay was reasonable.182 This reasoning is problematic because 
it overlooks inherent harms defendants suffer while awaiting trial and 
ignores situations where a defendant may fail to invoke the right to a 
speedy trial due to ignorance or factors beyond the defendant’s 
control.183 
In light of the Barker opinion’s emphasis on considering the fre-
quency and force of demands, courts are free to determine whether the 
effort a defendant makes to demand a speedy trial should be given 
heavy consideration.184 This creates situations where the nature of de-
fendants’ speedy trial demands may be dispositive in cases where defen-
dants are not actually acquiescing to delays.185 Therefore, the court may 
functionally return to the “demand-waiver rule” by treating a defen-
dant’s inability to demand a speedy trial as essentially waiving the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.186 In fact, courts have done this.187 
In State v. Spivey, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that a 
four-and-half year delay was sufficiently long to weigh in favor of the 
defendant, and since a congested docket caused the delay, the second 
 
180. Barker, 407 U.S. at 528–30. 
181. Herman, supra note 24, at 227. 
182. See Ex parte Anderson, 979 So. 2d 777, 781 (Ala. 2007) (holding that a 
defendant’s lack of demand demonstrated a lack of prejudice to the 
defendant). 
183. See supra Part II.B (quoting Justice Powell describing the harms defendants 
suffer while awaiting trial); Part II.D (discussing how courts weight the 
assertion factor against defendants who do not make technically sound 
demands for speedy trial). 
184. Barker, 407 U.S. at 529. 
185. See supra Part II (discussing harms to defendants waiting a long period for 
trial). 
186. See Darren Allen, Note, The Constitutional Floor Doctrine and the Right to 
a Speedy Trial, 26 Campbell L. Rev. 101, 112 (2004) (suggesting that some 
courts have applied pre-Barker precedent and turned the assertion factor 
into what could resemble the demand-waiver rule). 
187. State v. Spivey, 579 S.E.2d 251, 256 (N.C. 2003). 
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Barker factor was neutral—but slightly in favor of the defendant.188 The 
court reasoned that the delay was long enough to be presumptively 
prejudicial, and that the defendant suffered some prejudice from the 
unavailability of a witness.189 However, the court found that the assert-
ion prong of the Barker test weighed against the defendant, despite the 
fact that the defendant made a pro se motion for dismissal one year 
after his arrest and defendant’s counsel again moved to dismiss less 
than two years later.190 The court reasoned that the defendant did not 
have the right to be represented by counsel and appear pro se, so the 
initial motion to dismiss would not weigh in the defendant’s favor.191 
Therefore, the court held the defendant did not make a sufficiently 
timely or vigorous assertion and the defendant’s constitutional right to 
a speedy trial was not violated.192 Spivey essentially waived his right to 
a speedy trial by electing to file his initial motion pro se instead of 
through his attorney. 
Allowing courts to apply discretion to that effect was undoubtedly 
not Justice Powell’s intention in writing the Barker opinion, nor what 
the constitutional framers had in mind when they enacted the Sixth 
Amendment. The framers thought that trial delays were problematic 
enough to merit the codifying a right to a speedy trial and the Court 
has held this right to be fundamental. Upholding this fundamental and 
important right should not be left to the whims of lower court judges. 
C. Distortion of the Right to a Speedy Trial 
In addition to causing unjust results in cases where defendants’ 
speedy trial rights are violated, the assertion factor of the Barker test 
impacts the nature of the right to a speedy trial itself. In Barker, Justice 
Powell noted, “speedy trial is unique.”193 Powell further established that 
his speedy trial right analysis was meant to “comport[] with constitu-
tional principles.”194 This conflicting ideology in the Barker opinion has 
created inconsistency in speedy trial jurisprudence and distorted the 
meaning of the right to a speedy trial.195 There is nothing in the  
188. Id. at 255. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 256. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 257. The state made arguments along similar lines in Hartfield, 
claiming that the Hartfield’s pro se requests for relief were not assertions. 
See Brief of Appellee at 53, Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2014) (No. 13-14-00240-CR) (arguing that the defendant’s failure to 
assert the right to a speedy trial comes close to barring relief). 
193. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972). 
194. Id. 
195. Herman, supra note 24, at 222. 
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Constitution that signals the need to treat the right to a speedy trial 
different from other constitutional rights.196 Yet, courts treat the right 
to a speedy trial idiosyncratically.197 For instance, courts distinguish the 
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial from the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.198 Courts have interpreted the right to counsel clause 
as guaranteeing indigent defendants legal representation in criminal 
cases, unless a defendant affirmatively waives the right.199 Conversely, 
courts require defendants to demand their right in order to obtain the 
benefit of a speedy trial, and making demands does not guarantee that 
defendants will receive that benefit.200 
The dissonance between the language in the Sixth Amendment and 
courts’ application of the right is problematic because it distorts the 
values embedded in the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights was meant to 
protect the population from oppression by ensuring certain rights. 
When courts create conditions on those rights, the guarantee of pro-
tection is lost. David Sklansky has argued that the court has treated 
the Constitution’s criminal procedure rights not as “negative rights,” 
but as “quasi-affirmative rights.”201 According to Sklansky, quasi-affir-
mative rights are “affirmative constitutional conditions on actions that, 
realistically, the government cannot entirely forego.”202 This means that 
some constitutional rights, like the right to a speedy trial, require the 
government to take some kind of action, but only if conditions require 
the action.203 These rights are different from “negative rights” that pre-
vent the government from taking action, such as the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.204 
Courts’ application of the Barker test’s assertion factor fosters the 
speedy trial right’s quasi-affirmative nature. Courts grant the right to 
a speedy trial conditionally, depending on how and when defendants 
ask for the right. Further, the flexibility of the Barker test allows courts 
to create nearly impossible conditions for defendants to prove speedy-
trial-right violations, which begs the question of whether the Sixth 
 
196. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
197. Herman, supra note 24, at 210–11. 
198. Id. at 211. 
199. Id. at 150. 
200. See supra Part II.D (discussing how defendants must make “timely” and 
“vigorous” demands for speedy trial). 
201. Sklansky, supra note 161, at 1230. 
202. Id. at 1234. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
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Amendment actually guarantees the accused the right to a speedy 
trial.205 
Sklansky suggests that the reason that courts have developed quasi-
affirmative rights is hesitation to create demand for systematic 
reform.206 Imposing affirmative obligations on the government would 
place additional burden on governmental entities trying to perform 
those obligations and create demand from citizens that the government 
perform those obligations in an effective and efficient manner. On the 
other hand, establishing that a right is quasi-affirmative allows the 
courts to set parameters that define the right. These parameters create 
conditions on when courts may grant constitutional rights—like the 
right to a speedy trial—which allow the courts more room to deny that 
violations occurred.207 However, narrowing parameters and increasing 
freedom to deny violations comes with the cost of diminishing the pro-
tections contained in the Constitution. In the case of speedy trial rights, 
courts’ affirmative restraints have gone too far and placed an un-
constitutional and unjust burden on criminal defendants. 
IV. Improving the Test 
Scholars agree that the Barker test needs be re-calibrated.208 Justice 
Powell’s vague and unforceful language in the Barker opinion did not 
yield its intended results.209 Since Barker, courts have dismissed an ex-
tremely low number of cases for speedy trial right violations,210 and 
numerous authors have expressed concerns over state courts applying 
the Barker test with unjust results.211 Yet, flexibility is necessary to 
 
205. See supra Part II (discussing what courts consider proper assertions and how 
they weigh the assertion factor). 
206. See Sklansky, supra note 161, at 1286 (“It is not that judges refuse to impose 
affirmative obligations on the government, but rather that they decline to 
meddle in the overall operation of the criminal justice system.”). 
207. See generally id. (discussing conditional rights and courts’ unwillingness to 
grant rights that are quasi-affirmative). 
208. See Herman, supra note 24, at 208 (“[A]s Professor Uviller suggested, a 
court truly interested in deterring or punishing prosecutorial bad faith would 
recalibrate the factors in Barker v. Wingo.”); see also Uviller, supra note 61, 
at 1382–89 (critiquing the Barker test). 
209. See Uviller, supra note 61, at 1389–99 (analyzing the Barker test). 
210. Herman, supra note 24, at 231. 
211. See Lewis LeNaire, Comment, Vermont v. Brillon: Public Defense and the 
Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 219, 
219 (2010) (discussing whether the actions of a public defender causing a 
delay in trial should weigh against the government, or against the defendant 
being represented); see also Kaitlyn Roach, Note, The Sixth Amendment 
Right to a Speedy Trial: Sentenced to the Mississippi Gallows: Johnson v. 
State, 32 Miss. C. L. Rev. 205, 224–28 (2013) (discussing how Mississippi 
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account for the nuances in criminal prosecution.212 Therefore, an effect-
ive and palatable means of curing the problems created by the Barker 
test would be for courts to reinterpret the test by eliminating the asser-
tion factor and applying the remaining three factors: (1) the length of 
the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, and (3) prejudice to the defen-
dant.213 
Under the current Barker test, the assertion factor is superfluous. 
Applying a three-factor test, courts would not lose any ability to make 
effective decisions on speedy trial right violations because of the flexi-
bility allowed by the other three factors.214 Courts could easily analyze 
defendants’ lack of effort to demand speedy trial rights as a reason for 
the delay, or as showing a lack of prejudice to the defendant. In fact, 
courts have done this on occasion.215 Therefore, the proposed test would 
not cause much disruption in speedy trial decisions, while creating 
positive change. 
The proposed test would positively impact the criminal justice 
system in three ways. First, the three-factor test would increase dis-
missal rates and put pressure on the government to implement system-
atic changes that would improve the criminal justice system. Second, a 
three-factor test would create more consistency in speedy trial juris-
prudence and effectively put an end to the “demand-waiver rule.” 
Finally, the proposed test would remove the burden of requiring defen-
dants to demand the constitutional right to a speedy trial and restore 
the intended meaning of the language in the Sixth Amendment. 
 
courts have not granted speedy trial rights and have misapplied the law); 
Allen, supra note 186, at 112–13 (contending that the court applied the 
Barker test to effectively return to the “demand-waiver rule”). 
212. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972) (explaining the 
importance of an ad hoc balancing test). 
213. See infra Part IV.B. 
214. In an article written shortly after the Barker decision, Professor Uviller 
makes a similar argument. See Uviller, supra note 61, at 1391 (“In the 
absence of a waiver, evinced in the customary way, the Court should have 
moved to a consideration of the other factors.”). 
215. See Ex parte Anderson, 979 So. 2d 777, 783 (Ala. 2007) (“Anderson’s own 
conduct in waiting 22 of those 25 months before first asserting his right to a 
speedy trial, and then seeking a continuance, suggests, absent some contrary 
explanation, that Anderson did not consider the delay to be prejudicial.”); 
see also Lewis v. State, 469 So. 2d 1291, 1294 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (“The 
fact that Blake did not assert his right to a speedy trial prior to November 
1982, tends to suggest that he either acquiesced in the delays or suffered only 
minimal prejudice prior to that date.”). 
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A. Improving the Criminal Justice System 
In Barker, Justice Powell noted how governmental negligence and 
overcrowded dockets should be considered in speedy trial cases.216 How-
ever, Justice Powell considered that these are more “neutral reason[s]” 
for delays and should be given less weight than delays intentionally 
caused by the parties.217 Despite the tepidness in this part of the Barker 
opinion, courts have considered overcrowded dockets and scheduling 
problems as being attributable to government negligence, thus weighing 
in favor of defendants.218 The fact that judges can take control and 
“order a case assigned for trial”219 adds further support for defendants’ 
speedy trial claims because it weakens the position that delays were 
outside of government control.  
Since governmental negligence is a common cause of pre-trial de-
lays, courts often fall back on the assertion factor in order to deny 
dismissal. For example, in Adams v. State,220 the Mississippi Supreme 
Court refused to weigh the Barker factors in favor of the defendant.221 
The court acknowledged that the delay was caused by governmental 
negligence, and that the defendant’s counsel denied acquiescing to the 
delays.222 However, the court denied dismissal because a scheduling con-
flict with the defendant’s counsel contributed to the delay and the de-
fendant did not properly assert his speedy trial right.223 Under the pro-
posed three-part test, the Adams Court would have difficulty refusing 
dismissal. Conceding that the length of delay was sufficient and that 
the defendant was prejudiced, the court would only have the “reason 
for delay” factor to weigh against the defendant. The Adams Court 
would be forced to take a harder look at the governmental negligence 
that caused the delay. In order to deny dismissal, the court would need 
to rely on the fact that the defendant contributed to the delay, although 
the effect was minor.224 Therefore, the court would have little grounds 
to deny dismissal and the decision would be vulnerable on appeal. 
Further, under the proposed test, courts would no longer be able to 
claim that defendants are not prejudiced by delays because they failed 
 
216. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. 
217. Id. 
218. Epps v. State, 345 A.2d 62, 74 (Md. 1975). 
219. Id. 
220. 583 So. 2d 165 (Miss. 1991). 
221. Id. at 170. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 169–70. 
224. Id. at 170. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016 
Demanding a Speedy Trial 
302 
to make sufficiently vigorous and timely demands for speedy trial. 225 
Since there is strong policy against dismissals, the government would 
have to resort to other means to avoid speedy trial violations. The de-
sire to avoid dismissals would create an incentive for the government 
to mitigate pre-trial delays by making the criminal justice system more 
efficient. An analogy can be drawn to justifications for the exclusionary 
rule for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.226 
Evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure is ex-
cluded from the record in order to deter undesired police practices.227 
The rationale is that if fewer criminals are convicted when police violate 
the Fourth Amendment, then police will stop unconstitutional pract-
ices.228 In fact, the exclusionary rule has been shown to be effective in 
creating more professional police practices.229 Although courts have 
moved towards only applying the exclusionary rule in cases of egregious 
violations, courts could apply a similar remedy to Sixth Amendment 
speedy-trial-right violations. 230 If courts dismiss more speedy trial cases, 
then prosecutors will have an incentive to end the behaviors and policies 
that cause egregious delays.231 There is a concern of misplacing the in-
centive because prosecution is not always responsible for delays. 
However, judges could address that concern by appropriately weighing 
the “reason for the delay” factor when deciding cases. Additionally, 
there is no way of knowing how effective an increased dismissal rate 
would be in creating real systematic changes. Ideally, the government 
would be forced take a hard look at the criminal justice system and find 
ways to make lasting improvements. 
Problematically, however, systematic reform would require a great 
deal of work and expense. With so many moving parts involved in the 
criminal justice system, policy makers would need to conduct a great  
225. See State v. Fischer, 744 N.W.2d 760, 770 (N.D. 2008) (holding that because 
defendant did not assert his speedy trial right until a year after his arrest, 
the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay). 
226. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (discussing the importance of 
the exclusionary rule). 
227. Id. at 656. 
228. Id. 
229. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006) (“Another development 
over the past half-century that deters civil-rights violations is the increasing 
professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police 
discipline.”). 
230. See id. at 591 (“Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last 
resort, not our first impulse.”). 
231. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 45 (1970) (“[S]o far as society’s interest in 
the effective prosecution of criminal cases is concerned, delay on the 
government’s part need not impair its ability to prove the defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
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deal of analysis before making any adjustments. Before deciding what 
changes to make, the government would need to determine what needs 
to be fixed, what can be fixed, and the costs associated with im-
plementing the solutions.232 Given a limited budget, prosecutors could 
consider a cost-benefit analysis in order to decide what changes to 
make.233 The government would have to consider the associated costs 
and benefits of pretrial delays, and how to weigh them against one 
another.234 Even if the legislators can create a good policy plan, the 
government still faces political pressure and public backlash. Courts 
undoubtedly feel uncomfortable imposing these hardships on the 
government.235 
Further, courts may feel that it is the job of the legislature to in-
itiate systematic changes because the legislature controls the funding 
that fuels the criminal justice system.236 The legislature sets a budget 
that determines the number of prosecutors, police officers, and judges.237 
If the legislature is pressured by the courts to grant or deny funding, 
then effectively the courts have influenced policy. Also, judges have 
incentives to avoid putting pressure on the legislature because the legis-
lature determines the judges’ salaries.238 Presumably, spending public 
money to benefit criminal defendants awaiting trial would not be pop-
 
232. See John Roman, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Criminal Justice Reforms, Nat’l 
Inst. Of Justice (Sep. 11, 2016), https://www.nij.gov/journals/272/pages/ 
cost-benefit.aspx [https://perma.cc/2U3T-5UTS] (discussing the complica-
tions involved with cost-benefit analysis of criminal justice reform). 
233. See id. (explaining that cost-benefit analyses in criminology compare the 
costs and benefits of proposed programs with the costs and benefits of current 
programs and that policymakers could use these comparisons to determine 
whether new approaches will be beneficial from a budgetary perspective). 
234. An example of a systemic problem is underfunded public defender programs. 
Many states have a large backlog of cases because there are insufficient funds 
to support enough public defenders to efficiently resolve cases. See Debbie 
Elliot, Need A Public Defender In New Orleans? Get In Line, NPR (Feb. 
4, 2016, 4:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/02/04/465452920/in-new-
orleans-court-appointed-lawyers-turning-away-suspects [https://perma.cc/ 
J4RR-TASC] (explaining the problems caused by underfunded public 
defender programs). 
235. See Sklansky, supra note 161, at 1284 (“The general aversion courts feel 
toward affirmative rights may be especially pronounced in this context 
because courts would not just be ordering states to do things that cost 
money, but would be directly compelling expenditures.”). 
236. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 7 (1997). 
237. Id. 
238. See 28 U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (explaining that judges’ salaries are determined by 
statute). 
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ular. However, a more efficient system could foster many societal ben-
efits. For instance, a more efficient criminal justice system would mit-
igate the costs of detaining defendants awaiting trial.239 Defendants 
moving swiftly through the criminal justice system would allow jails to 
free up space and potentially save local communities large amounts of 
money.240 Moreover, although systemic changes may be costly, budget 
concerns should not be favored over the protection of constitutional 
rights. The government needs to be accountable for its actions and 
abide by constitutional principles. 
B. Eliminating the “Demand-Waiver Rule” and  
Increasing Consistency in Opinions 
A three-factor test would more effectively fulfill the Barker Court’s 
intention of eliminating the “demand-waiver rule.”241 Under the three-
factor test, courts would have a difficult time denying relief to defen-
dants who suffer long pre-trial delays, but do not make demands for a 
speedy trial. Courts would still be free to consider defendants’ failures 
to demand in conjunction with the other factors, but they would lose 
the ability to make a supposedly failed assertion dispositive. In order 
to deny dismissal, a court would have to show that a defendant’s lack 
of effort to demand a speedy trial was part of the reason for the delay, 
or demonstrated a lack of prejudice to the defendant. Similarly, prose-
cutors would have to show that a defendant benefited from failing to 
assert the right to a speedy trial. Placing this burden on the prosecution 
would eliminate the presumption that defendants waived the constitu-
tional right by not making a proper assertion. This argument is support-
ed by Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Dickey v. Florida.242 In his con-
currence, Brennan discusses how the Court has moved toward a pre-
sumption against waiver.243 Brennan then reasons that the right to 
speedy trial is decidedly fundamental, and asks the question, “can it be 
 
239. Cf. Christian Henrichson, Joshua Rinaldi & Ruth Delaney, The Price of Jails: 
Measuring the Taxpayer Cost of Local Incarceration, Vera Inst. of Justice 
24 (May 2015) (describing the enormous community costs of local 
incarceration). 
240. See id. (“The only way localities can safely reduce the costs incurred by jail 
incarceration is to limit the number of people who enter and stay in jails.”). 
241. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972) (“We, therefore, reject 
both of the inflexible approaches—the fixed-time period because it goes 
further than the Constitution requires; the demand-waiver rule because it is 
insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental.”); see also Dickey 
v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 49 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he equation 
of silence or inaction with waiver is a fiction that has been categorically 
rejected by this Court when other fundamental rights are at stake.”). 
242. 398 U.S. 30, 50 (1970). 
243. Id. at 49.  
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that affirmative action by an accused is required to preserve—rather 
than to waive—the right?”244 Justice Brennan was addressing the flaws 
of the “demand-waiver rule,” but the same rationale can apply to the 
effect of the assertion factor in the Barker test. If the presumption of 
waiver is fundamentally unconstitutional, then why continue weighing 
defendants’ inaction against them? 
Additionally, the proposed test would create more consistency in 
speedy trial jurisprudence and better equip defendants attempting to 
prove speedy trial right violations. The proposed test would accomplish 
this by eliminating confusion over what constitutes a proper assertion 
of the right to a speedy trial and what should be considered sufficiently 
“vigorous” or “timely.”245 Courts would still be able to consider the 
vigorousness and timeliness of assertions, but as part of the analysis of 
the remaining factors. Therefore, improved doctrines and patterns of 
reasoning may emerge from case law. For example, courts could con-
sider defendants’ failures to object to multiple continuances made by 
prosecution as evidence that the “reason for delay” factor should weigh 
in favor of the state. Courts could also consider the reasons for a defen-
dant’s failure to object to a motion for continuance and decide whether 
the defendant actually benefited or acquiesced to the delay. If a defen-
dant did take advantage of the continuances, then the court could either 
weigh “the prejudice to the defendant” factor in favor of the state, or 
find the “reason for the delay” factor neutral if the delays were partially 
caused by government negligence. The three-part test would take away 
an unfair advantage given to the state and lead to more just speedy 
trial jurisprudence. 
C. Restoring the Constitutional Right 
A speedy trial test without the assertion factor would make decis-
ions more consistent with the original intent of the Sixth Amendment.246 
For example, consider a case like that of Jerry Hartfield, where an in-
carcerated defendant is awaiting a trial that never happens.247 The gov-
ernment allows a defendant to slip through the cracks, and due to in-
digence and mental incompetence, the defendant is completely unaware 
of his rights.248 When addressing the defendant’s speedy trial right viola-
tion claim, the court would apply the proposed three-factor test. 
Assuming that the length of the delay was sufficient to create a pre-
 
244. Id. at 50 (emphasis omitted). 
245. See supra Part II.D (discussing how courts weigh the assertion factor). 
246. See supra Part I.A (discussing the historical background of speedy trial 
jurisprudence). 
247. See supra notes 1–17 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Jerry 
Hartfield). 
248. Id. 
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sumption in favor of the defendant, the court would only have to con-
sider the reason for the delay and whether the defendant was prejudiced 
by the delay. Under the basic facts of Hartfield—assuming no other 
procedural problems—the reason for the delay would be a combination 
of governmental negligence, the defendant’s incompetence and lack of 
counsel, and possibly minor prosecutorial malfeasance. In light of these 
facts, the court would have a hard time not weighing the reason for the 
delay in favor of the defendant. Additionally, the court would have 
difficulty weighing the prejudice factor in favor of the government; 
Hartfield’s case was delayed so long that evidence was lost, and key 
witnesses were unavailable.249 A court properly following the proposed 
test would almost certainly dismiss the case. 
Further, courts would lose the ability to refuse to dismiss cases 
when defendants fail to meet the vague requirements of the assertion 
factor and defendants would lose the burden of proving they really 
wanted a speedy trial. This is undoubtedly more consistent with the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that “the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial.”250 Under the proposed test, courts would 
guarantee defendants are protected against the harms of waiting long 
periods for trial, without imposing the undue burden of properly asking. 
A three-factor test may be problematic because the court would 
theoretically be letting more criminals go free, opening up a variety of 
potential hazards for society. However, The U.S. Supreme Court has 
stated that the government is responsible for bringing the accused to 
trial.251 A test without the assertion factor would hold the government 
accountable for that responsibility and still allow courts to prevent un-
deserving defendants from taking advantage of the system. For ex-
ample, courts have considered acquiescence to delay as demonstrating 
a lack of prejudice to the defendant.252 Expanding jurisprudence along 
those lines would allow courts to restore the fundamental principles of 
the constitutional right to a speedy trial by providing greater protection 
to the accused. Unfortunately, this may give the court the difficult task 
of defining what a constitutionally speedy trial really means. In order 
to promote justice, courts should be prepared to meet the challenge. 
 
249. Ford, supra note 17. It is possible that losing evidence would favor the 
defendant, but without clear indication of what that evidence would show the 
court must either weight the factor in favor of the defendant, or render the 
factor neutral. 
250. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
251. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972) (“A defendant has no 
duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the 
duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.”). 
252. Ex parte Anderson, 979 So. 2d 777, 781 (Ala. 2007). 
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Conclusion 
Justice Powell unquestionably had good intentions for including 
“assertion of the right to a speedy trial” as a factor in Barker test. The 
factor has allowed courts to favor defendants who make a great deal of 
effort in seeking trial and to disfavor defendants who wish to take ad-
vantage of the system. However, the assertion factor is not only un-
necessary to speedy trial right analysis, it is also problematic in appli-
cation. Due to unclear standards, courts use the assertion factor to deny 
dismissal in cases where defendants’ constitutional rights are violated. 
The Barker test’s assertion factor has also caused courts to deviate from 
the intended meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Removing the assertion 
factor from speedy trial analysis would allow courts to restore the inten-
tion behind, and meaning of, the Sixth Amendment, mitigate unjust 
decisions, and ideally lead to improvements in the criminal justice 
system. 
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